

SECRET//NATO  
R 09 0420Z APR 00

FROM: HQ, 2nd Marine Division  
TO: HQ, 2nd Marine Regiment  
PRECEDENCE: FLASH  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NATO  
SUBJECT: OPOD - OPERATION RESET



## I. SITUATION

### Enemy Forces

(S/NATO) Although the city of STOCKHOLM itself has been shattered by Soviet nuclear missiles, the enemy forces near STOCKHOLM include 336<sup>th</sup> Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (UPPSALA), 76<sup>th</sup> Guards Airborne Division (ARBOGA), 125<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion (KATRINEHOLM), and 317<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion (NYKÖPING). These units are understrength and consist mainly of light infantry with few serviceable armored fighting vehicles. Nearby units to the south include 318<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion (NORRKÖPING), 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Motor-Rifle Division (LINKÖPING), and 131<sup>st</sup> Pechenga Motor-Rifle Division (VÄSTERVIK).

(S/NATO) The enemy's Capabilities include defensive positions in their cantonment areas. They might have increased supplies of ammunition and prepared additional fighting positions over the winter. Enemy Limitations include understrength units weakened by continued combat against Swedish partisans, insufficient food and fuel, poor communications, lack of air cover, no direct land supply routes, and a doctrinal tendency toward low-momentum operations.

(S/NATO) The enemy's most likely Course of Action (EMLCOA) is to hold and defend.

(S/NATO) The enemy's most dangerous Course of Action for the success of this operation would be to hold their positions and counterattack with their southern units into our flanks.

(S/NATO) Enemy forces in southeastern Sweden include:

- 336<sup>th</sup> Guards Naval Infantry Brigade (UPPSALA) [BTR]
- 76<sup>th</sup> Guards Airborne Division (ARBOGA) [BMD]
- 125<sup>th</sup> Armor Battalion (KATRINEHOLM) [T-80]
- 317<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion (NYKÖPING) [BTR]
- 318<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion (NORRKÖPING) [BTR]
- 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Motor-Rifle Division (LINKÖPING) [BMP / T-72]
- 131<sup>st</sup> Pechenga Motor-Rifle Division (VÄSTERVIK) [BMP / T-72]

(S/NATO) Enemy forces near the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment objective at SÖDERTALJE are:

- 317<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion
  - Battalion Headquarters (HHC)
  - 3x Naval Infantry Company (BTR-80)
  - Mortar Platoon (82mm/120mm)
  - ATGM Platoon (9K111)
- 125<sup>th</sup> Armor Battalion
  - Battalion Headquarters
  - 5x Tank Company (T-80)
  - Engineer Section
  - Communications Section
  - Maintenance Section
  - Support Platoon
  - Medical Section

### Friendly Forces

(S/NATO) The purpose of OPERATION RESET is to divide Soviet forces in southern Sweden and connect with the isolated Swedish forces and the USS Truman at STOCKHOLM.

(S/NATO) 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment's avenue of advance from LIDKÖPING to ÖREBRO from LD FOLLOW ME through thrust EDGE is bounded on the south flank by Lake VÄTTERN. The Älvsborg Infantry Brigade, from Milo S under LTG Stjernlöf, will protect the south against Soviet counterattack.

(S/NATO) 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment's avenue of advance from LIDKÖPING to ÖREBRO from LD FOLLOW ME through thrust EDGE is bounded on the north flank by Lake VÄNERN.

(S/NATO) Strengths of assigned friendly units should be considered one echelon lower due to losses in manpower and equipment, particularly vehicles and artillery, and no air assets are available due to the fuel shortage. Personnel numbers for most units are half, or less, of peacetime end-strength.

(S/NATO) US forces assigned to OPERATION RESET include:

2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division

2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division Headquarters Battalion and AAB (ALINGSÅS)

10<sup>th</sup> Marine Artillery Regiment (BORÅS) [M198 155mm]

2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment (LIDKÖPING)

6<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment (FALKÖPING)

8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment (TROLLHÄTTAN)

2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion (SKÖVDE) [M1A1]

(S/NATO) Swedish forces assigned to OPERATION RESET include:

Milo S (LTG Daniel Stjernlöf, Commanding)

Älvsborg Infantry Brigade (TRANÅS) [CV 90]

Milo V (LTG Conny H Pedersén, Commanding)

Skaraborg Armored Brigade (SKARA) [Strv 121]

Life Regiment Hussars (KARLSBORG) [Rangers]

#### Attachments/Detachment

(S/NATO) The Skaraborg Armored Brigade from SKARA will work closely with 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division to handle civilian operations on the battlefield (COB), translation, route guidance, and prisoner handling.

(S/NATO) Divisional artillery is minimal due to low ammunition. Divisional air support is grounded.

#### Civil/Terrain considerations

(FOUO) Sweden is an occupied neutral nation that has requested assistance from NATO to repel the invading Soviet forces. They are our friends; however, there may be local quislings assisting the Soviets.

(FOUO) The terrain from LIDKÖPING to SÖDERTALJE is slightly hilly, mainly forested, with numerous lakes and areas of flat, open farmland around built-up areas and along main roadways.

(S/NATO) Observation and Fields of Fire: Although the terrain is generally flat or only has small hills, lines of sight are restricted by forests outside of farm country, so units must travel in column.

(S/NATO) Cover and Concealment: There is a lot of cover and concealment along the advancement route, which means there are opportunities for ambushes. Proper reconnaissance is necessary.

(S/NATO) Key Terrain: The main roads, towns, and road junctions are key terrain. The primary decisive terrain for 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment is the city of SÖDERTALJE.

(S/NATO) Avenues of Approach: The highway between LIDKÖPING and ÖREBRO is route 44 and then E20, which goes east to ÖREBRO, where the division will wheel right from PL SECOND to advance on STOCKHOLM through SÖDERTALJE along axis CORNER.

## II. MISSION

(S/NATO) 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment's mission is to spearhead the advance from PL SILENT into SÖDERTALJE with armored support from the Swedish Skaraborg Armored Brigade and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion so that 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments can freely secure STOCKHOLM. 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment is to begin the advance northeast from LD FOLLOW ME toward ÖREBRO at 10 0300Z APR 00, crossing PL SECOND by the end of D+1, and crossing PL SILENT by D+2, advancing on OBJ DOG (SÖDERTALJE) NLT 14 0500Z APR 00.

## III. EXECUTION

#### Commander's Intent

(S/NATO) The Center of Gravity of 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division lies on the main axis of advance, with 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion, and the Swedish Skaraborg Armored Brigade acting as the spearhead of the attack. 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments act as the division reserve until such time as SÖDERTALJE is fully invested, when they will take up the advance on STOCKHOLM.

(S/NATO) The Critical Vulnerability of the main thrust to STOCKHOLM is the possibility of enemy armor attacks. This could come from the south flank from the 125<sup>th</sup> Armor Battalion at KATRINEHOLM.

(S/NATO) The Desired End State of this mission is the liberation of SÖDERTALJE, which will allow the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division to advance to STOCKHOLM and connect with the Swedish Svea Life Guards and the USS Truman.

#### Tasks

(S/NATO) 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment is to advance along axis EDGE, preceded by the Swedish Skaraborg Armored Brigade and supported by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion, turning east at ÖREBRO and advancing on SÖDERTALJE, being prepared for possible encounters with the Soviet 317<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry Battalion and/or 125<sup>th</sup> Armor Battalion, and taking control of the town. Once the town is invested and captured, 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments will advance between SÖDERTALJE and STOCKHOLM with 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment and 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion acting as rear security and division reserve.

IV. SERVICE SUPPORT

## Administration

(S/NATO) All EPWs are to be transferred to Skaraborg Armored Brigade for segregation and interrogation. Friendly casualties are to be evacuated to the nearest Battalion Aid Station.

## Logistics

(S/NATO) All elements of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment have received around three days of critical supplies of all classes. Additional supplies are held at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division HQ.

V. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

## Command

(S/NATO) Location of Key Leaders: The 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment command staff and headquarters element will remain in the rear one-third of the regimental area while the regiment is moving. Upon occupation of SÖDERTALJE, the command staff will relocate to the center of the town.

(S/NATO) Succession of Command: If the regimental commander becomes a casualty, the senior battalion commander in the regiment is to take command.

## Signal


(S/NATO) Primary: Encrypted frequency-hopping radio communication by FM radio.

(S/NATO) Alternate: Clear radio communication by FM radio using CE01 while on the move to set up renewed encrypted communication via SINGARS ERF.


(S/NATO) Contingency: Encrypted radio communications by HF radio when stopped.

(S/NATO) Emergency: Vehicle-borne courier.

Respectfully,



Joseph W. Berriman  
MG, Commanding  
2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division  
United States Marine Corps



**SECRET**

R 17 2020Z APR 00

SECRET//NATO

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R 17 2020Z APR 00

FROM: HQ, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment  
TO: HQ, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division  
PRECEDENCE: URGENT  
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET//NATO  
SUBJECT: SITREP

SITUATION: It is the end of D+6; seven days since the initiation of OPERATION RESET. Soviet personnel strength has been higher than predicted, likely because Soviet conscripts have no way to blend in with the Swedish population or desert back to the Soviet Union. The advance from LD FOLLOW ME to PL SECOND went off track when the 76<sup>th</sup> Guards VDV division attacked the Swedish Skaraborg Armored Brigade at ÖREBRO, but it got worse when the Soviet 125<sup>th</sup> Tank Battalion and 1<sup>st</sup> Guards MRD counterattacked into the division's right flank behind us and decimated 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiments. We can only assume that the Soviets had advance warning of our operation. While 6<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> regiments and the Skaraborg Armored Regiment were pushed northwest toward KARLSTAD, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Armor Battalion took on the 317<sup>th</sup> Naval Infantry battalion in the enemy rear. We conducted a fighting withdrawal under heavy pressure from the 1<sup>st</sup> Guards MRD, which engaged us all the way back to MARIESTAD, which they occupied, forcing us to take refuge in nearby TÖREBODA. We are now cut off from all friendly forces.

INTELLIGENCE: The two Soviet naval infantry battalions at ESKILSTUNA are dug in well. They have numerous BTR-80s and several antitank guided missile systems that crippled and destroyed several of our LAVs. Besides the Soviet forces, there seems to be a small contingent of civilian "volunteers" assisting them with building defenses, and sometimes even manning them. They wear red armbands over their civilian clothing for identification, but they could easily blend into the general population.

OPERATIONS: 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment is no longer combat effective as a unit. We are basically out of food, fuel, and ammunition, and have become widely separated. We will not surrender, but if we are pressed, we may have to move farther away from the Soviet troops.

LOGISTICS: We have nothing. Marines are hungry, cold, and tired and have only a few magazines remaining. Vehicles out of fuel have been abandoned and the remainder have little left, and many of those are damaged. We are out of MREs and the Corpsmen are out of bandages and IV bags.

COMMUNICATIONS: We haven't had any communication with division headquarters or allied units in almost two days. Communications within the regiment are now unencrypted and primarily on vehicle radios.

PERSONNEL: Personnel strength is down by 90% from our peacetime TO&E, with vehicles around 3% of established end strength.


COURSE OF ACTION:

I have decided that the survival of the regiment is more important than wasting our meager strength on a feeble attempt to break through enemy lines to reach an objective that is no longer relevant (or possible). I have given the order to move back to division HQ at ALINGSÅS to reorganize and refit, assuming the rest of the division is still in any way intact.

Many of the civilians we have liberated, along with some of the Swedish soldiers who remained when the tanks rolled out, wish to remain with us for their own safety. We are bringing them with us as far as they want to go. They will also assist us in finding our way back through the Swedish forests and with translation and scouting. Units subordinate to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment will operate independently from now on in their efforts to return to the division.

I have communicated with the units we could reach to let them know that we are on our own.

00RAH!



John B. Macek  
COL, Commanding  
2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Regiment  
2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division  
United States Marine Corps